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Abstract: Wegner’s refutation of the notion of a conscious free will is ad-
dressed to a general reader. Despite a wide ranging and instructive survey
and a conclusion acceptable to current psychological thinking, it is flawed
by terminological confusions and lack of attention to relevant evidence and
previous psychological approaches. It is suggested that psychology best
drop the term will altogether.
Wegner (2002) has written an important book that primarily ad-
dresses a general rather than specialist audience. Wegner dwells
relatively briefly on important psychological research, for exam-
ple, his brief allusion to priming studies without discussion of the
pertinent implicit/explicit distinction. He touches most of the rel-
evant (and sometimes forgotten) bases and rehearses an argument
that has dominated scientific psychology for about a century. The
process of addressing the general reader results in a breezy, read-
able approach. Since I have little quarrel with Wegner’s general
view of conscious will, I shall briefly summarize his major contri-
butions, and then concentrate on a few of the topics that he has
left unsaid.
First a word about terminological confusions in using terms like
mind and consciousness. Thus, the “conscious mind” (Wegner
2002, p. 11) is used at one point, but elsewhere mind is the usual
combination of human thought, perception, and conception, that
is, a summary term for the mental processes. Similarly, conscious-
ness is abused in such uses as “consciousness experiences” (p. 36)
or “consciousness doesn’t know” (p. 67), and on subsequent pages
(e.g., p.318). The empirical will is usefully defined in terms of “re-
lationships  between...  thoughts,  beliefs,  intentions,  plans,  or
other conscious psychological states and...   subsequent actions”
(p. 15). But why just conscious states? On page 27, the conscious
qualification is left out, and in various other places proper atten-
tion is paid to the function of the multitude of unconscious mech-
anisms and representations that occupy cognitive psychologists.
Chapter 3 is central to the book; it starts with the “theory” that
conscious will is experienced when people interpret their thoughts
as the cause of action. This is surely a concise statement of the phe-
nomenon but hardly a theory. The statement was supported in in-
genious experiments (Wegner & Wheatley 1999), but Wegner
threatens to throw the baby out with the bathwater when he im-
plies that mental events can never be causal agents for thought and
action. This is in conflict with a body of research that has shown
since 1989 that visual and auditory imagery may in fact have such
causal efficacy (see, e.g., Michelon & Zacks 2003; Pilottiet al.
2000). The following chapters delve deeply into the literature on
automatism, the uses of the illusion of will, and related problems
of agency, hypnosis, and many others.
There is a paucity of references to previous psychological dis-
cussions of free will. In one I must declare an interest (Mandler
& Kessen 1974), but the most important omission is Westcott’s
1977 paper (which also includes a number of references to other
psychological discussions of volition). It is especially unfortunate
that Wegner has not had occasion to include this essay because he
has skipped many of Westcott’s topics. Westcott surveys relevant
(rather than discursive) philosophical arguments and points of
view, and in his section on the psychology of free will, Westcott ad-
dresses such factors as cognitive dissonance, attitude change, and
locus of control as well as various variants of decisions such as “ra-
tional decision,” “snap decision,” “random choice,” and “coerced
choice.” All of these are accompanied by “experienced will.” West-
cott offers a flow chart of the precursors of such experienced will
that combines historical and current determinants, alternatives,
and cognitive activity (including attention, valuation, and criterion
setting). The final result is remarkably similar to Wegner’s con-
clusions about empirical will.
I mention the paper that Kessen and I presented in 1974 pri-
marily in order to make an additional argument. We noted that
whereas free will is a human construction rather than a fact of ex-
istence, a belief in free will is still probably a desirable state of af-
fairs. The belief that one is free to choose from among different
alternatives generates a delay in thought and action that brings
more alternatives to the fore, and strengths among them may
change in the light of evidence. Such a delay “is likely, though not
certain, to bring some increment to the quality of the final choice”
(Mandler & Kessen 1974, p.316). We also suggested that as young
children discover that their actions influence their environment,
they develop a theory of personal efficacy that contributes to the
belief in voluntary control. Our suggestions add in small part to
Wegner’s notion in Chapter 9 that the experience of free will acts
to organize our experience of our own agency.
Wegner’s final chapter starts with a well-argued discussion of
the relationship between conscious willing and determinism, and
makes interesting contributions to the advantage of conscious will
in providing a sense of authorship and of achievement. Finally,
while Wegner’s distinction between conscious and empirical will
is useful, what is missing is a disciplined discussion of the empiri-
cal will. Wegner (as well as other writers such as Westcott) leaves
us with a complex menu of possible contributors to intentional, di-
rected action – but no roadmap, no recipes. Maybe it would be
best to forget about the problem of will altogether. Now that we
understand what the subjective feeling of willing is about, we can
return to our major problem: to understand, explain, and predict
human thought and action. Will, in general, is too easily confused
with conscious, illusory will. It also has unfortunate links with the-
ories of the will associated with national socialist Germany (Man-
dler 2002). I would prefer to define conscious will in terms of
Wegner’s explanation, and get on with the work of psychology
without extraneous baggage, such as attempts to define a deter-
minist will.
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